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Abstract
The genus Henipavirus includes Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus (NiV), for which fruit bats (particularly those of the
genus Pteropus) are considered to be the wildlife reservoir. The recognition of henipaviruses occurring across a wider
geographic and host range suggests the possibility of the virus entering the United Kingdom (UK). To estimate the
likelihood of henipaviruses entering the UK, a qualitative release assessment was undertaken. To facilitate the release
assessment, the world was divided into four zones according to location of outbreaks of henipaviruses, isolation of
henipaviruses, proximity to other countries where incidents of henipaviruses have occurred and the distribution of Pteropus
spp. fruit bats. From this release assessment, the key findings are that the importation of fruit from Zone 1 and 2 and bat
bushmeat from Zone 1 each have a Low annual probability of release of henipaviruses into the UK. Similarly, the importation
of bat meat from Zone 2, horses and companion animals from Zone 1 and people travelling from Zone 1 and entering the
UK was estimated to pose a Very Low probability of release. The annual probability of release for all other release routes was
assessed to be Negligible. It is recommended that the release assessment be periodically re-assessed to reflect changes in
knowledge and circumstances over time.
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Introduction
The genus Henipavirus includes Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah
virus (NiV), which have been associated with disease in horses and
pigs, respectively. From 1994, 26 outbreaks of henipaviruses have
occurred in Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Bangladesh
[1,2], with consequent trade implications in Oceania and Asia [3].
Even more significantly, both viruses are zoonotic, and have
caused substantial mortality in humans (case fatality rate for HeV
is 57% [4] and variable for NiV ranging from 9% in Singapore to
100% in Nadia, India [1]). Therefore both HeV and NiV are
major public health concerns.
HeV was first discovered in September 1994 following a sudden
outbreak of an acute respiratory syndrome in thoroughbred horses
in a racing stable in Brisbane, Australia. Thirteen out of 20
infected horses died and a stable-hand and trainer were infected,
the latter fatally [5]. Since 1994 there have been 14 HeV
outbreaks that have resulted in horse fatalities [5,6] and to the time
of writing there have been a total of 7 human cases (4 deaths), all
of which were associated with contact with horses [7]. In order to
contain the outbreaks, procedures were implemented, such as
movement restrictions; destruction and sanitary disposal of horses
shown to be infected (by presence of antibodies); disinfection of the
environment and quarantine of in-contact animals until they have
been shown to be free from HeV (by repeated serological tests) [8].
Serological evidence of HeV infection was identified in fruit bats of
the genus Pteropus (commonly known as flying-foxes). All four
species of flying-fox that occur in mainland Australia (Pteropus
alecto, Pteropus poliocephalus, Pteropus scapulatus and Pteropus conspicilla-
tus) were subsequently identified as reservoir hosts for HeV [9].
Four years later, in late September 1998, a novel disease
outbreak in pigs in peninsular Malaysia and an associated
outbreak of typically severe febrile encephalitis in humans was
identified. A Hendra-like virus, subsequently named Nipah Virus
was identified as the etiologic agent [10]. Between September
1998 and May 1999, 265 encephalitis patients, which included
105 deaths [3], were reported in three states of Malaysia [11].
Most patients with Nipah encephalitis in Malaysia were pig
farmers. The virus isolates obtained from both human patients and
sick pigs showed identical nucleotide sequence [11] and therefore
pigs were implicated as the primary source of human infection.
Over one million pigs were culled to control the outbreak [10].
Malaysian bat species were prioritised for surveillance to identify
the reservoir of NiV subsequent to the discovery of fruit bats being
the likely reservoir for HeV in Australia. Blood and tissue samples
were collected and Pteropus vampyrus and Pteropus hypomelanus were
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have since occurred in Bangladesh where, as in Malaysia and
Australia, fruit bats of the genus Pteropus (Pteropus giganteus) were
identified as a putative natural reservoir [12]. Horizontal human
transmission was also documented in the 2004 NiV outbreak in
the Faridpur district in Bangladesh [13,14] and also in Siliguri
India, which is close to affected areas in Bangladesh [15]. In
Singapore workers at pig abattoirs in which Malaysian pigs were
slaughtered were infected with NiV [16]. In Malaysia 7 pig
abattoir workers showed antibody against NiV and had therefore
been exposed to the virus [11].
Overlapping distributions of only three species of fruit bats are
needed to form a continuous link between the east coast of
Australia and Pakistan. The geographic distribution of pteropid
bats is shown in Figure 1 [17]. The species of fruit bats that are
believed to be important in the transmission of henipaviruses
because of their implication in outbreaks include: (i) P. alecto, P.
poliocephalus, P. scapulatus and P. conspicillatus [18]; (ii) P. vampyrus
[9,19,20]; (iii) P. hypomelanus [9,19,20]; and (iv) P. giganteus
[12,21,22]. Currently, data on the prevalence of henipaviruses in
fruit bats are limited. Most studies have been undertaken to
estimate the seroprevalence in various species of fruit bats and the
results are provided in Table 1. The data from Table 1 were
obtained from non-random sampling of the fruit bats and show a
range in seroprevalence from 1% (P. rufus, Madagascar [23]) to
63% (P. vampyrus, Malaysia [19]). More recently, HeV and NiV
antibodies have been detected in non-pteropid bats in Madagascar
[23] and China [24], and both antibodies to and viral RNA of
henipaviruses have been detected in Ghana [25,26]. Fruit bats
have not developed clinical disease when experimentally infected
with henipaviruses [27,28].
HeV and NiV have an extended host range. During the 1998/
1999 NiV outbreak in peninsular Malaysia infection occurred in
domestic dogs and cats that were exposed to infected pigs [29,30].
At a later date (2004) cats at the site of the outbreak and near to a
bat colony with antibodies to NiV were not infected [31]. When
experimentally infected with either Hendra or Nipah viruses cats
develop severe clinical disease [32,33,34]. HeV has been
experimentally shown to infect guinea pigs and pigs [27,31].
Although the clinical signs in pigs infected with HeV seem to be
more severe than those for NiV [35] this may be due to the high
experimental dose. Infection of humans is usually from an
amplifier host, such as from pigs for NiV [10] or horses for HeV
[5], however human NiV infection from fruit bats has been
reported [12,36].
The mode of transmission to humans and animals is uncertain.
However, it is thought to be via close contact with contaminated
tissue or body fluids from infected animals or eating foodstuffs
contaminated with fruit or fruit pulp disgorged by fruit bats. NiV
was isolated from partially eaten fruit in peninsular Malaysia [20]
and the ingestion of contaminated date palm sap has been
implicated in NiV outbreaks in humans in Bangladesh [37].
The ability of henipaviruses to produce disease that causes
significant mortality in humans has made this emerging viral
infection a serious public health concern. To estimate the
likelihood of henipaviruses entering the UK, a qualitative release
assessment was undertaken. Using the World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE) methodology for import risk analysis, the
release assessment describes ‘‘the biological pathways(s) necessary
for an importation activity to ‘release’ (that is, introduce)
pathogenic agents into a particular environment, and estimating
the probability of that complete process occurring…’’ [38].
Therefore, the risk question was defined as ‘what is the annual
probability of henipaviruses being released into the UK via imported animals,
imported foodstuffs and humans?’ Due to the genetic and pathogenic
similarity of HeV and NiV, combined with their high level of cross
reactivity and similar disease ecologies, the henipaviruses are
considered at the generic level for this study.
Methods
The routes considered within the release assessment are:
imported bats (all species) (Figure 2a); insectivorous bats flying
into the UK (Figure 2b); imported pigs, horses and companion
animals (Figure 2a); humans (Figure 2c) and imported food stuffs,
which includes pigmeat, fruit, fruit juices and bat bushmeat
(Figure 2d). Using the pathways given in Figure 2, a release
assessment was developed using the risk analysis guidelines
developed by the World Organisation for Animal Health [39].
In order to standardise the different qualitative probabilities
assigned within the release assessment and to increase transpar-
ency, each probability has been defined using definitions used by
the European Food Safety Authority [40], see Table 2.
The probability of henipaviruses being released into the UK (R)
for the pathways in Figure 2 can be assessed by combining the
number that is imported annually (N) with the results from the
probability pathway (P) which assesses the probability per animal,
human or tonne of foodstuff. P is estimated by considering the
multiplicative outcome of two probabilities P1 and P2, P3, P4 or P5
where P1 is defined as the probability that a source is infected or
contaminated. The probabilities P2, P3, P4 or P5 provide the
conditional probability given that the animal or human is infected
or foodstuff contaminated henipavirus is introduced to the UK.
Therefore P2 is the probability that an animal that is infected with
henipavirus is not detected on entering the UK; P3 is the
probability that an infected bat survives flight to the UK; P4 is the
probability that a human infected with henipavirus is well enough
to travel and, finally, P5 the probability that the virus present on or
in a foodstuff survives transport to the UK. The qualitative
estimates for the probabilities P1 and P2, P3, P4 or P5 are combined
using the matrix approach as described by Gale et al. 2009 [41],
which is used to describe probabilities that are multiplicative.
Using this matrix, the maximum probability (P) is the minimum of
the multiplied probabilities. The combination of P and N is not
multiplicative and is considered on a case-by-case basis.
1 Assessing the probabilities per individual animal,
human and tonne of foodstuff (P)
For each release pathway, the probability of importing
henipaviruses per animal, per human or per tonne of foodstuff is
estimated (P) (Table S1). Outside the UK, the transmission routes
between different animal species, food stuffs and humans are not
Figure 1. World distribution of fruit bats of genus Pteropus [17].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027918.g001
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(in qualitative terms) of the probabilities Pi, i=1,…, 5.
1.1 Fruit bats. Information on the location of outbreaks of
henipaviruses, virus isolation and the geographic distribution of
fruit bats (genus Pteropus) were combined to divide the world into
four zones (Figure 3). Zone 1 includes countries with outbreaks of
henipaviruses or where henipaviruses have been isolated from fruit
bats and is therefore assumed to present a higher degree of
interaction, or potential interaction, between infected fruit bats
and humans or domestic animals (Australia, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, India, Malaysia). In Singapore, the human cases
were abattoir workers who developed the disease at the same time
of the Malaysian outbreak. In the abattoir, 80% of pigs
slaughtered were from Malaysia and it was therefore concluded
that this was the source of the outbreak [42]. Given the different
epidemiology in Singapore, this country is not included within
Zone 1. No outbreaks have occurred in Cambodia but NiV has
been isolated from fruit bats [43]. A Zone 2 country borders a
Zone 1 country and fruit bats (specifically Pteropus) are distributed
in the country (Bhutan, China, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Thailand, Vietnam). Zone 3 includes all other countries in
Eurasia, Africa and Australasia that have detected antibodies
that cross-react with henipaviruses in fruit bat species. Finally
North and South America are classified as Zone 4 as they share no
bat species with the ‘‘Old World’’ and there is no evidence for
henipaviruses in people or animals. Consequently, Zone 4 is not
considered further within this assessment as the probability of
release is deemed to be negligible. Using the information available
and the definitions provided in Table 2 it is estimated that the
probability of a fruit bat being infected with henipavirus (P1)i n
Zone 1 is Medium because outbreaks have occurred due to direct or
indirect contact with infected fruit bats. Although no outbreaks
have occurred in Zone 2, countries within this zone border a Zone
1 country and Pteropus fruit bats, that can travel considerable
distances, are present and therefore P1 is assessed to be Low. For
Zone 3, the geographic distribution of fruit bats and distance that
fruit bats can travel suggest that there is a Very Low probability of
fruit bats being infected.
Fruit bats imported to the UK must comply with the Rabies
Import Order and spend 6 months in quarantine, excluding
vampire bats which must spend their lives in quarantine.
Currently, no tests for henipaviruses are undertaken for bats
imported to zoos. Fruit bats do not develop clinical disease when
experimentally infected with henipaviruses [27,28]. It is therefore
assumed, due to the combination of both a lack of diagnostic
screening and the absence of clinical signs, that detection of
henipavirus is unlikely. In addition, there is evidence for latent
infection and recrudescence in bats [44] which may also increase
the likelihood of not detecting the virus. Therefore the probability
of the virus not being detected in fruit bats (P2) is assessed to be
High.
1.2 Insectivorous bats. There is evidence to suggest that
insectivorous bats can be infected with henipaviruses; antibodies
for NiV were detected in Scotophilus kuhli in Malaysia [29] and in
Myotis species in China [24]. Myotis daubentonii is distributed across
Europe and Asia, including the UK [45]. No surveys for
henipaviruses in insectivorous bats in the proximity to the UK
have been reported so knowledge of the presence or absence of
infection is lacking and no outbreaks have occurred in the
European Union (EU). Further, it is reasonable to assume that an
infected insectivorous bat is more likely to be located where
Table 1. Seroprevalence of henipaviruses (HeV and NiV) in fruit bats.
Species of bat
Location of
study
Sero-acting
virus
Number
tested
Number
positive
Sero-prevalence (95% CI,
where given) Reference
P. alecto, P. poliocephalus, P. scapulatus, P.
conspicillatus
Australia HeV 1,043 - 47% Field et al., 2001 [3]
P. vampyrus Indonesia HeV 79 19 24% Sendow et al., 2006 [22]
Indonesia NiV 84 32 38% Sendow et al., 2006 [22]
Malaysia NiV 56 35 63% Shirai et al., 2007 [19]
Malaysia NiV 29 5 17% Johara et al., 2001 [29]
Thailand NiV 39 1 2.6% Wacharapluesadee et al.,
2005 [20]
P. hypomelanus Malaysia NiV 102 18 18% Shirai et al., 2007 [19]
Malaysia NiV 35 11 31% Johara et al., 2001 [29]
Thailand NiV 26 4 15.4% Wacharapluesadee et al.,
2005 [20]
P. giganteus India HeV 39 11 28% Epstein et al., 2008 [21]
India NiV 39 20 54% Epstein et al., 2008 [21]
P. lylei Thailand NiV 813 76 9.3% Wacharapluesadee et al.,
2005 [20]
E. helvum Ghana HeV 59 13 22% (11–33) Hayman et al., [26]
Ghana NiV 59 23 39% (27–51) Hayman et al., [26]
E. dupreanum Madagascar HeV 73 11 15% Iehle et al., 2007 [23]
Madagascar NiV 73 14 19% Iehle et al., 2007 [23]
P. rufus Madagascar HeV 349 2 1% Iehle et al., 2007 [23]
Madagascar NiV 349 6 2% Iehle et al., 2007 [23]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027918.t001
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bats are the reservoir host and hence the need for direct or indirect
transmission to occur, insectivorous bats are predicted to have a
Low probability of infection in Zone 1. Similarly, a Very Low
probability of infection is estimated for Zone 2 and a Negligible
probability of infection in Zone 3.
For imported bats, tests for henipaviruses are not undertaken
prior to entry to the UK. Very little is known on whether infected
insectivorous bats show clinical disease. However, work by both
Johara et al. [29] and Li et al. [24] detected antibodies to NiV or a
closely related virus in apparently healthy insectivorous bats,
which indicates that infection in insectivorous bats is at least
sometimes non-fatal, and possibly sub-clinical. The incubation
period of HeV and NiV in insectivorous bats is unknown. Given
the above, it is assumed that P2 is High, although there is a high
level of uncertainty associated with this estimate of probability.
Figure 2. Release pathways for henipaviruses to be released into the UK via (a) imported bats (all species), pigs, horses and
companion animals; (b) ‘‘natural importation’’ of insectivorous bats; (c) via human travel; (d) via a tonne of imported foodstuffs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027918.g002
Table 2. Definitions of risk [40].
Probability Category Interpretation
Very High Event occurs almost certainly
High Event occurs very often
Medium Event occurs regularly
Low* Event is rare but does occur
Very Low* Event is rare but cannot be excluded
Negligible Event is so rare that it does not merit to be considered
*Note: it is possible that the event is occurring but is not detected by current surveillance schemes/methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027918.t002
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would survive a journey to the UK due to the large distance to
travel and therefore only Zone 3 is considered for the release of
henipaviruses via insectivorous bats flying to the UK. Similar to
the above, the probability of a bat surviving such a journey will be
related to the likelihood and severity of clinical signs, it is therefore
predicted that P3 is High.
1.3 Companion animals. Companion animals may enter
the UK from countries in which henipaviruses are present via 6-
month quarantine or, if eligible, the Pet Travel Scheme (PETS)
which has a 6 month waiting period [46]. From Zone 1, only cats
and dogs from Australia and Malaysia may enter via the PETS
scheme as a listed third country. Likewise, Zone 2 animals from all
but one country (Taiwan) will undergo quarantine procedures.
Companion animal movements from Zone 3 countries will be
under PETS (EU Member States (MSs) or listed third country) or
6 month quarantine. During the 6 month waiting period for PETS
the animal is not confined and thus there is an increased likelihood
(compared to quarantine) of an animal being exposed to
henipaviruses if infection is present in the country of origin.
In addition to PETS, there is a further restriction on the import
of companion animals from peninsular Malaysia. Cat or dog
movement is prohibited unless health certification is provided by
the Malaysian Veterinary Authority to confirm that the animal: (i)
has had no contact with pigs during at least the 60 days prior to
export; (ii) has not been resident on holdings where during the past
60 days any case of Nipah disease has been confirmed; and (iii) has
had a negative result to an ELISA for Nipah antibody on a sample
of blood taken within 10 days of export undertaken in a laboratory
approved by the Veterinary Authority [47]. Furthermore, cats that
have been resident in Australia must have a certificate from the
Australian Veterinary Authority confirming that at no time have
they been on a holding where HeV has been confirmed during the
60 days prior to departure [47].
In assessing the probability of a companion animal being
infected, it is considered that natural HeV infection in cats has
never been reported. Given that fruit bats are the reservoir host
and hence the necessity of direct or indirect transmission to occur
for cats or dogs to be infected, it is assumed that cats and dogs have
a much lower prevalence of infection than fruit bats, although
there is uncertainty here as there is a lack of information on the
degree of contact between cats and dogs and fruit bats. Additional
restrictions in Australia and Malaysia will also reduce the
probability of a cat or dog intending to travel to the UK being
infected. It is therefore estimated that the probability of a cat or
dog that is intending to travel to the UK from Zone 1 being
infected with henipavirus is Very Low and Negligible for Zones 2 and
3, respectively.
The incubation period for HeV and NiV in experimentally
infected cats is 4–8 days [34] and 6–8 days [32], respectively. The
incubation period for NiV in dogs is unknown and therefore is
assumed to be similar to cats. Clinical signs for henipaviruses in
cats are fever, increased respiratory rates, followed by severe illness
and death within 24 hours. Clinical signs in dogs for NiV include
fever, respiratory distress, conjunctivitis and severe cases result in
death. Mills et al. [48] reported that NiV infection was detected, by
immunohistochemical examination, of 2 dogs (1 dead; 1 dying)
that were in the epidemic area of the NiV outbreak in peninsular
Malaysia. Consequently, it is likely that an infected incubating
companion animal will display signs when entering the UK via
quarantine or PETS as the schemes’ waiting period is substantially
longer than the incubation period. As a consequence it is predicted
that the probability of not detecting infection (P2)i sVery Low for all
three zones, but it is noted however that illegal movements of
animals – not subject to PETS or Quarantine – will have a higher
probability.
1.4 Pigs. NiV infection in pigs is highly transmittable and as
described above, pigs were implicated as the primary source of
human infection in the outbreak in Malaysia in 1998–1999 [11]. It
is believed that the establishment of pig farms within the range of
the natural host and the planting of fruit trees near these farms led
to the initial introduction of henipaviruses into the pig population
[49]. The maintenance of high densities of pigs led to the rapid
dissemination of the infection within local pig populations, and the
transport of pigs to other areas for commerce led to the rapid
spread of disease in pigs in southern Malaysia and Singapore [3].
Figure 3. Identification of risk zones for henipavirus. Zone 1: countries with outbreaks of henipaviruses or where henipaviruses have been
isolated from fruit bats. Zone 2: country that borders a Zone 1 country and Pteropus fruit bats are distributed in the country. Zone 3 indicates all other
countries in Eurasia, and Africa and Australasia, which includes countries that have detected antibodies to henipaviruses in fruit bats. Zone 4: North
and South America, which share no bat species with the ‘‘Old World’’ and no henipaviruses have been isolated or antibodies detected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027918.g003
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serum samples collected from 100 swine herds in Queensland
(Australia) anti-HeV antibodies were not detected. Given the
susceptibility of pigs to HeV under experimental conditions, the
possibility of pigs being naturally infected with HeV in Australia
cannot be completely dismissed, but is considered to be at a Very
Low probability. This is taken into account when accessing the
likelihood of pigs and also pig meat products being infected or
contaminated, respectively, with henipavirus.
Given the previous outbreaks in Bangladesh, India and
Malaysia and the necessary transmission of the virus from fruit
bats it is predicted that there is a Low probability of a pig from
these countries being infected, but a Very Low probability for
Australia and Cambodia. Overall the probability of a pig from
Zones 1, 2 and 3 being infected (P1) is estimated to be Low, Very
Low and Negligible, respectively.
NiV has an incubation period of 4–14 days in pigs. Clinical
signs in pigs include fever, respiratory distress and neurological
signs such as trembling, twitching and muscle spasms [50]. Tests
for henipaviruses are not undertaken on pigs entering the UK.
Imports of pigs from specified third countries must comply with
the animal health conditions laid down in the Community
legislation and be accompanied by a health certificate, signed by
an official veterinarian of the Veterinary Authority in the country
of origin [51]. A previous risk assessment estimated shipping times
to the UK from different regions of the world [52], which are also
used here. The estimated minimum shipping time from Oceania is
19.5 days; 12.6 days from Southern Asia; 17.1 days from South
Eastern Asia; 16.4 days from Eastern Asia and 5.2 days from West
Africa. Therefore, it is possible for a pig that is incubating the
disease to enter the UK if imported from Zone 1 particularly if
imported from Southern Asia (12.6 days) and therefore it is
estimated that the probability of the infection not being detected
(P2)i sLow. Zone 2 countries are in Southern Asia, Eastern Asia
and South East Asia, for which the minimum journey time ranges
from 12.6 days to 17.1 days therefore, as above, P2 is estimated to
be Low. A journey time from Zone 3 will vary greatly and may be
via sea or land. The journey time is therefore assumed to range
from 1 day (overland travel within Europe) to 11.4 days (Southern
Africa) and consequently it is estimated that P2 is Medium for Zone
3.
1.5 Horses. HeV was discovered in thoroughbred horses in a
racing stable in Brisbane, Australia, in 1994. Horses displaying
clinical signs can survive infection, and both field observations and
laboratory transmission experiments have shown that although
horizontal transmission can occur, it does not occur readily.
Infected horses can also be asymptomatic or have mild clinical
signs [3]. Given the occurrence of outbreaks in Australia and the
potential possibility of cases of HeV in other Zone 1 countries
(although never reported) it is assumed the probability of a horse in
Zone 1 being infected is likely to be Low. Again, as with previous
release routes, this takes into account the necessity for the virus to
be transmitted to horses from the reservoir hosts, fruit bats. For
Zone 2 and Zone 3, it is estimated that the probability P1 is Very
Low and Negligible, respectively.
Horses are imported to the UK from Zones 1, 2 and 3; however
tests for henipaviruses are not undertaken prior to entry although
veterinary checks will be undertaken. The incubation period of
HeV in horses ranges from 4 to 16 days, but is typically 8–11 days
[27,53,54]. Clinical signs of HeV in horses include depression,
ataxia, tachycardia, fever and death for acutely affected horses
with severe respiratory distress [27]. Using the information given
above for minimum shipping times it can be concluded that it is
possible for a horse that is incubating the disease to enter the UK if
travelling by sea. However, it is also noted that due to the high
value placed on many of the horses entering the UK (e.g. for show
jumping; racing) horses may also enter by land or by ‘plane.
Consequently the minimum journey time is assumed to be one day
for all zones and therefore the probability of not detecting a horse
infected with henipavirus (P2) is assessed to be High.
1.6 Humans. Evidence from past outbreaks has shown that
humans can become infected with henipaviruses through contact
with a domestic animal amplifying host (pigs [10], horses [5]),
humans [13,14,15] and from direct contact with fruit bats [12,36].
In relation to the probability of a human being infected (P1)i ti s
considered that P1 will be Very Low in Zone 1 and Negligible in
Zones 2 and 3. This takes into account the number of reported
cases within each zone, the total human population sizes and also
an assumption that this probability is likely to be less than P1 for a
pig or horse.
In humans, the incubation period is generally between 4–45
days for NiV [50] and 5–21 days for HeV [6,55]. Human
infections of NiV range from asymptomatic to fatal encephalitis.
Initial symptoms in humans include myalgia, fever and the disease
may progress to encephalitis with drowsiness, disorientation,
convulsions, coma and severe cases result in death [50]. Symptoms
for HeV range from mild influenza-like illness to fatal respiratory
or neurological disease.
Humans are not tested for henipaviruses and journeys to the
UK will typically be less than 1 day. Therefore, a human who is
incubating the disease could introduce henipaviruses to the UK if
well enough to travel and as a consequence of this the probability
P4 is estimated to be High.
1.7 Foodstuffs. Foodstuffs that could plausibly be
contaminated with henipaviruses include fruit, date palm sap,
fruit juice, pork products and bat bushmeat. Fruit bats mainly
feed on fruit and thus there is an increased likelihood of fruit
being contaminated with urine and saliva in areas where fruit
bats roost and feed (NiV has been isolated from partially eaten
fruit [56]). There is evidence of food-borne transmission, for
example date palm sap in Bangladesh has been identified as a risk
factor for human infection [36]; however it cannot be ascertained
from import data if this particular product is imported into the
UK and, if so, how much is imported. For this reason, date palm
sap is not considered further. Given the high degree of contact
between fruit bats and fruit there is a possibility of fruit being
contaminated with saliva from fruit bats infected with
henipaviruses. Therefore it is predicted that the probability that
a tonne of fruit or fruit juice is contaminated (P1)i sLow for Zone
1. Likewise, for Zone 2 and Zone 3 it is assessed to be Very Low
and Negligible, respectively.
Pork products may also be a source for henipaviruses to be
released into the UK if pigs are infected. No information was
obtained on the presence of NiV in meat from infected pigs and
therefore, as a worst case scenario, it is assumed that the meat will
be contaminated. Members of the Paramyxoviridae, although
enveloped viruses, are heat-sensitive. Therefore using this
information it is assumed that cooked and cured products will
have a lower probability of contamination than raw pork products.
It is probable that freezing meat contaminated with henipaviruses,
with subsequent thawing, would have a minimal effect in reducing
the viral load. It is therefore assumed that the probability
associated with frozen pork products (P1) is equivalent to fresh,
chilled pork products, which are predicted to be Low in Zone 1;
Very Low in Zone 2 and Negligible in Zone 3. Due to the processes
undertaken (e.g. cooking, curing) the probability per tonne of
processed pork (P1) is estimated to be Very Low in Zone 1, but
Negligible for Zones 2 and 3.
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UK is via illegally imported bushmeat, particularly bat meat,
which is consumed in many countries in Asia and Africa [26]. For
bushmeat being illegally imported into the UK, a tonne would
consist of a large number of bats, not all of which will be of the
genus Pteropus. However, because these types of bats are larger
than many other species it is possible that these may be
preferentially selected for bushmeat trade. As a tonne of bushmeat
would consist of a large number of bats and therefore given the
Medium probability of infection in Zone 1 for an individual bat, it is
predicted that a tonne of bushmeat originating from Zone 1 would
have a High probability of contamination, P1. For the same reasons
as described above it is predicted that the corresponding
probability of a tonne of Zone 2 bushmeat containing henipavirus
is Medium. Given the Very Low probability of Zone 3 fruit bats being
infected, it is assumed that the probability of contamination per
tonne of bushmeat is Very Low.
Tests for henipaviruses are not undertaken for legal foodstuffs
or, by definition, illegal foodstuffs prior to entry into the UK.
However a foodstuff entering the UK could only be contaminated
if the virus survives the journey. Import data available from H M
Revenue and Customs suggest that 90–100% of non-EU fruit
commodity enters the UK by sea, the exception mostly being
berries (43%). From the EU, 88% arrives by sea, 8% by road and
only 0.03% by air. Travel by air would most likely be reserved for
highly perishable, non-bulky, high value commodities. Although
the commodity codes make it difficult to know exactly what fruit
was imported, many of the commodity codes provide an indication
of fruit that is likely to be imported via air into the UK from Zone
1. Pig meat (fresh, frozen or processed) is rarely imported via air
freight. However, bushmeat may enter the UK via air passengers
luggage and therefore travel time may be less than 1 day. Shipping
times from different regions in the world are provided in Section
2.1.4.
Fogarty et al. [57] reported that at 37uC, henipaviruses are
virtually inactivated in 1 day in pH-neutral bat urine from the
genus Pteropus. However, repeating the experiment with urine at its
natural pH of 2, inactivation was significantly quicker (less than 30
mins at both 22uC and 37uC). At 22uC, henipaviruses can survive
for more than 4 days in pH-neutral bat urine. The same study also
considered survival of henipaviruses in fruit juice and on mango
flesh. On mango flesh, survival time ranges from 2 hours to more
than 2 days, however desiccation reduces the survival time of
henipaviruses to less than 2 hours. In acidic fruit juice, inactivation
took less than 4 days. No information was reported on the survival
of henipaviruses on pork products or bat meat; although it is
known that the pH of meat ranges from 5.2–7 and therefore
slightly acidic. Additional quantitative studies on the survival of
henipaviruses on different foodstuffs are required.
Using the information given above for survival of HeV and NiV
and transport times from different regions of the world, it is
predicted that there is a Negligible probability of henipavirus
surviving on pig meat (fresh, frozen or processed) imported from
Zone 1 or Zone 2 (P5). From Zone 3, which includes European
countries that are clearly much nearer the UK, it is assumed that
there is a Medium probability of henipavirus surviving the journey.
For fruit, it is unlikely that the virus will survive for the duration of
transport to the UK if being shipped; however up to 10% of some
fruit commodities will not enter by ship but by air and therefore
significantly reducing the transport time and having a higher
probability of survival due to a decreased temperature during the
transport as airfreight. Given this, it is predicted that the
probability of henipavirus surviving in a tonne of fruit is Low for
both Zones 1 and 2. As was previously the case, travel times will be
shorter from Zone 3 and therefore the probability of the virus
surviving (P5) is estimated to be Medium. Similarly for fruit juice the
probability P5 is estimated to be Medium for Zone 3, but Negligible
for Zones 1 and 2 due to the assumption that juice imported from
Zones 1 and 2 will enter the UK via ship. Finally, for bushmeat the
worst case scenario was taken, which is that the meat will enter via
air (i.e. passengers bringing the meat in their personal luggage) and
therefore it was assumed that the travel time is 1 day.
Consequently, the probability of henipaviruses surviving (P5)i s
assessed to be High for all Zones.
2 Assessing the number of imports (N)
Data were collected for the number of animals (bats, companion
animals, pigs, horses), the number of humans travelling to the UK
[58], and the amount of foodstuffs (tonnes) imported in 2008 (see
Table S1). Trade statistics were supplied by Defra (from H. M.
Revenue and Customs datasets) or Animal Health (bats and
companion animal trade information only). If quantitative data
were not directly available, a qualitative estimate of the amount of
imports is provided. It is important to note that these qualitative
quantities do not correspond to those provided in Table 2, which
relates to probabilities, and that the assigned levels of importation
are only appropriate for 2008 and therefore may change
(significantly) in future years.
The number of horses imported from Zone 3 is highly uncertain
due to a £260,000 (approximately $416,500) threshold that is
applied to horses coming from EU MSs, i.e. only horses above this
value are reported. From the EU, 2876 horses were recorded as
entering the UK, which is assessed to be a Low level of
importation. In order to adjust for the under-reporting, this
qualitative estimate is increased to Medium as many horses from
Zone 3 are likely to be imported that are beneath this high
threshold value. There is also uncertainty associated with the data
for the amount of fruit imported into the UK. The two
commodities recorded are fresh or dried fruit and prepared or
preserved fruit. Clearly, the process of drying or preserving fruit
will have an impact on the probability of the virus surviving – fresh
fruit and fruit preparations (i.e. without any processing) are the
main commodities of interest but it is not possible to distinguish
these types. Therefore all fruit imports are included in the release
assessment, which provides a worst case scenario.
Chaber et al. 2010 [59] estimate that 3,287 tonnes of meat and
fish are illegally imported via Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle
airport from Africa; 273 tonnes (8%) is bushmeat. No bat meat
was seized. However the study took place over a brief period (1
week) and searched a relatively small number of passengers. A
VLA risk assessment for illegal meat [52] estimated that between
4,398 and 28,626 tonnes per year is illegally imported into Great
Britain (GB), which compared to legally imported meat is very
small. Eastern Asia, Near and Middle East, Eastern Europe,
Southern Africa and Western Africa were the regions with the
highest rates of illegal meat flow. However, information was not
obtained on the proportion of illegal meat that is bat meat.
Considering the total amount of illegal meat imported from each
zone relative to the quantities of foodstuffs imported via legal
routes, it is concluded that Zone 1 has a Very Low level of illegal
imports; Zone 2 has a Low level and Zone 3 has a Medium level.
Mickleburgh et al. [60] reviewed the consumption of bat meat in
many countries, including the frequency of consumption and the
amount that is traded, and these data are used to provide an
indication of the desire of visitors or UK tourists to bring bat
bushmeat to the UK. For example, in Cambodia and Malaysia
(Zone 1), bat meat is regularly eaten and there is internal trading
of the product. Given this information, and the fact that the
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number of tonnes of bat bushmeat brought into the UK from
Zone 1 will be Very Low. Likewise, for Zone 2, the tonnage of illegal
bat meat is estimated to be Very Low due to many countries in this
zone (e.g. China, Laos, Thailand, etc.) regularly consuming and
trading bat bushmeat. Finally, it is estimated that the amount of
bat meat brought into the UK from Zone 3 is also Very Low. This is
due to the intensity of consumption and trade in Sub-Saharan
Africa, compared to South East Asia and East Asia, being lower
which is also alluded to by Jenkins & Racey, 2008 [61].
Results
Combining the qualitative estimates for the probabilities P1 and
P2, P3, P4 or P5 the animal or human release route with the highest
probability, per individual, (P) was assessed to be fruit bats
imported from Zone 1, which had a Medium probability of being
infected at the point of entry to the UK (Table S1). This is due to
the medium probability of a fruit bat being infected; combined
with a high probability of non-detection and survival during the
importation process. Likewise, for foodstuffs, the release route with
the highest probability was a tonne of illegally imported bat
bushmeat from Zone 1, which had a High probability of being
contaminated. This was attributable to the High probability of a
tonne of bushmeat containing a fruit bat that had been infected
with a henipavirus and the high probability of virus survival if
bushmeat enters the UK via personal baggage on an aeroplane.
On a per unit basis, many Zone 3 routes were assessed to have a
Negligible probability of release due to a Negligible probability of
infection or contamination (P1). However due to long shipping
times many products imported from Zones 1 & 2 were also
assigned a Negligible probability of contamination (pork products &
fruit juice) at the point of entry to the UK. Therefore, per unit, the
routes with a non-negligible probability of release (P) are fruit bats
(all zones), imported insectivorous bats (Zones 1 & 2), companion
animas (Zone 1), pigs (Zone 1 & 2), horses (Zone 1 & 2), humans
(Zone 1), fruit (Zone 1 & 2) and bat bushmeat (all zones).
In relation to the annual probability of release, the number of
imports (N) and P are combined using a non-matrix approach, i.e.
assessing each combination of N and P on a case-by-case basis. It is
assumed that if the number of imports (N) is negligible, that the
probability of release is also negligible. Many of the release routes
were predicted to have a non-negligible annual probability of
release, but these were assessed to be Low (importation of fruit
from Zone 1 and 2 and bat bushmeat from Zone 1) or Very Low
(importation of bat meat from Zone 2, horses and companion
animals from Zone 1 and people travelling from Zone 1).
Discussion
The main aim of this release assessment was to determine the
different likelihoods of henipavirus introduction associated with
different release routes and areas of the world. As expected, many
of the non-negligible probabilities are associated with Zone 1,
which includes countries with recent outbreaks of henipaviruses or
where henipaviruses have been isolated. The possibility of infected
humans entering the UK may be of public health concern
especially as horizontal transmission of NiV was documented in
Bangladesh [13] and a high case fatality rate reported. Similarly,
there has been evidence of direct transmission of HeV from horses
to humans [62]. Although a large number of release routes have
been considered, these are not exhaustive. For example, due to a
lack of knowledge on the amount of date palm sap imported into
the UK it was not possible to assess the probability of release from
this food product.
For many of the imports (animals and foodstuffs), no products
were imported and therefore Negligible probabilities were assigned,
e.g. live pigs from Zones 1 and 2; insectivorous bats (all zones);
fresh or frozen pork products (Zone 2) and processed pork
products (Zones 1 & 2). However, it is important that this release
assessment is revisited if imports of these commodities occur in the
future, and especially if the imports are from Zone 1. Likewise,
although imports did occur from all three zones, there is a high
degree of uncertainty associated with the number of horses
imported from Zone 3 due to the fact that only horses arriving
from other EU MSs with a value greater than £260,000 are
reported. In addition, the release assessment does not take into
account events such as the Olympics 2012, when a larger numbers
of horses will enter the UK. Therefore, N will increase for horses
during this period, which may impact the overall probability of
release.
The grouping of countries into zones greatly simplified this
release assessment, whilst still identifying those countries that are
of a higher likelihood of infection. However it is recognised that
the classification of countries into zones will be very much
impacted on by the under-reporting of outbreaks of henipaviruses
within the Zones as no or low levels of surveillance (including lack
of diagnostic capacity) in animal (fruit bats, horses and pigs) and
human populations may result in henipavirus not being detected.
This does provide notable uncertainty to the results of this release
assessment. It is therefore important to review the epidemiological
situation on a periodic basis and, if necessary, adjust the country
groupings accordingly. Where possible, heterogeneity within the
Zones has been taken into account, especially in relation to their
past and current epidemiological situation and veterinary and
public health services. If a greater level of certainty were required,
a full assessment (country-by-country) could be undertaken, but
this would be more time-intensive. However, this qualitative
release assessment could be used as a screening tool, therefore
highlighting the release routes and countries for which a more
detailed assessment is required.
The validation of a release assessment such as this is
problematic. For foodstuffs, testing was not undertaken, though
if it was, the number of tests would be limited, so validation of the
Low or Very Low probabilities of henipavirus contamination on
foodstuffs would still be difficult. In the case of animals and
humans, validation data is from the clinical surveillance of NiV
and HeV. Companion animals, horses and humans entering the
UK from Zone 1 are all assigned a Very Low probability of release.
There have been no reported cases of NiV or HeV in the UK,
hence suggesting that the assessed probabilities might be valid but
does not inform us whether a Negligible or Low probability would
actually be a better estimate. Therefore it is advised that more
focus is placed on the relative results, that is between animal,
humans and foodstuffs and, within these categories, between
zones.
The consideration of the genus henipavirus, rather than NiV
and HeV individually, may not be deemed appropriate for the
animal release routes due to the inclusion of pigs and pig products
and horses directly relating to the individual viruses NiV and HeV
respectively. As yet, HeV has not been reported in pigs (only
experimentally [35]) although NiV has been reported in horses in
Malaysia [63]. The foodstuff release routes may be more impacted
by any separation of HeV and NiV, mostly due to the differing
amounts imported into the UK from the individual countries
within Zones 1 & 2. However, since the level of importation from
Zone 1 and Zone 2 countries is, in general, notably lower than
Zone 3 it may be the case that the qualitative estimates of N will
not change greatly if the Zones were to be redefined for the
Qualitative Release Assessment for Henipavirus
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neity between the different viruses and countries within the same
zones has been considered when assigning and combining
probabilties within this release assessment.
Because of the large number of release routes and the
consideration of 3 zones for each route, a matrix approach was
used to simplify the analysis. The use of a matrix to combine
qualitative probabilities has both advantages and disadvantages. It
provides a structured way of combining qualitative probabilities;
thus increasing transparency to some extent. However there is no
‘true’ matrix, thus the matrix published by Gale et al, [41] was used
but other examples include those given by Moutou et al. 2001 [64]
and EFSA [65], which was also used by Heller et al. 2010 [66].
The choice of the matrix may influence the level of uncertainty as
to the overall results of the release assessment. To assess the impact
of adopting an alternative matrix, the EFSA matrix was also
applied. The results (not shown) from this extra analysis showed
that all of the overall release estimates (R) remained the same with
the exception of bat bushmeat from zone 1, which was reduced
from the original estimate of Low to Very Low.
Overall, this assessment assumes that fruit bats are the natural
reservoir for henipaviruses, and that spill-over of henipaviruses to
susceptible species is dependent on direct or indirect contact with
an infected fruit bat e.g. via urine or contaminated fruit. Farming
practices for the various countries where fruit bats are distributed
are an important factor in determining whether humans or
animals will become exposed to contaminated tissue or body fluids
of infected bats. Further epidemiological and virological investi-
gations need to be undertaken to address data gaps in the
assessment such as the prevalence of henipaviruses in fruit bats,
transmission of the virus, clinical signs and incubation period in
species such as insectivorous bats, survival in different foodstuffs,
etc. This release assessment could also be linked to an exposure
and consequence assessment in order to estimate the overall risk to
UK human and animal health.
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